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Abstract 
Among the different sources of uncertainty in population forecasting, uncertain changes 
in the structure of heterogeneous populations have received little attention so far, 
although they can have significant impacts. Here we focus on the effect of changes in 
the educational composition on the overall fertility of the population in the presence of 
strong fertility differentials. With data from India we show that alternative paths of 
future female enrolment in education result in significantly different total fertility rates 
(TFR) for the country over the coming decades, even assuming identical fertility trends 
within each education group. These results from multi-state population projections by 
education are then translated into a fully probabilistic population projection for India in 
which the results of alternative education scenarios are assumed to expand the 
uncertainty range of the future TFR in the total population. 
This first attempt to endogenize structural change with respect to education – 
which is the greatest measurable source of fertility heterogeneity in Asia – has resulted 
from a larger exercise of the Asian MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable 
Development Analysis to collect empirical information, scientific arguments as well as 
personal, informed opinions about likely future population trends in Asia from a large 
number of population experts in the region. The paper summarizes this exercise, in 
which individual experts were also asked to give their views on the uncertainty ranges 
of future demographic rates. The paper also describes the errors of past population 
projections in the region and summarizes the main findings from in-depth interviews of 
these experts, resulting in the conclusion that education trends are a main determinant of 
future fertility, thus providing the reason for this attempt to endogenize the education-
fertility link in probabilistic population forecasts. 
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Toward Structural and Argument-Based Probabilistic 
Population Projections in Asia: Endogenizing the 
Education-Fertility Links 
Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov 
Introduction 
Asia’s population, which comprises more than half of the world’s population, is currently 
going through significant structural changes. While the population of Asia is still expected to 
grow from currently 3.5 billion to around 4.8 billion in 2050, for the second half of the 
century we expect the beginning of a population decline (see Lutz et al. forthcoming-A). 
Simultaneously Asia’s population is expected to age dramatically, with the proportion above 
age 60 expected to increase from currently 9 percent to some 23 percent by the middle of the 
century and more than 35 percent toward the end of the century. But there are very significant 
regional differences in Asia both with respect to expected future population growth and with 
respect to the speed of aging. While in 2050 we expect almost 40 percent of the population of 
Japan to be above age 60, this proportion is projected to only increase to 18 percent in South 
Asia. Simultaneous to this significant demographic change Asia is experiencing very 
significant changes in terms of its human capital as measured by the educational composition 
of the population by age and sex. Due to significant educational efforts in many parts of Asia 
over the past decades, the young population tends to be much better educated than the older 
one. Since better-educated women in Asia have lower fertility, this has direct demographic 
consequences. The improvements have been particularly impressive in China, where it is 
estimated that within two decades China will have more working-age people with secondary 
and tertiary education than Europe and North America together (Lutz and Goujon 2001). 
These future demographic trends, however, are highly uncertain. The projections cited 
above only refer to the best guess from today’s perspective, or more precisely the median of 
an uncertainty distribution. It is hard to say precisely, how social, economic and even 
environmental changes in Asia will play together in determining the future trends in fertility, 
mortality and migration in different parts of the continent. On the other hand, we are not 
completely ignorant about the future size or structure of the population. Many of the people 
who will be alive in 2030 have already been born, and we know their cohort sizes. Also, we 
can assume with high probability that a country in the midst of its fertility transition will 
continue with its fertility decline until a low level is reached. How should we communicate 
this to policy makers, who want to get the best synthesis of what we can say about the future 
trends to base their planning on these forecasts? To tell them that we simply do not know will 
not serve them well, especially if we think we know more than nothing. It is a bit more 
informative to say, here is one scenario and here is another, but we do not know how likely 
they are. This still does not help them much in their planning. Giving them just one 
projection, however, and telling them that this is the way the future will look, is probably 
highly welcome by the planners but very dangerous, if there are any costs associated with a 
projection error. A false feeling of certainty can be very harmful and we should not create it, 
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especially when we know better. The challenge for the population forecaster, therefore, is to 
try to be specific of what we think is more certain and what is less certain, and to what degree 
uncertainties differ. The most comprehensive and efficient, and therefore best way to do so is 
to produce probabilistic forecasts. 
In the Asian context this task was taken on by the Asian MetaCentre for Population 
and Sustainable Development Analysis. The Asian MetaCentre is a group of population 
research institutes throughout Asia with headquarters at the National University of Singapore 
and a training branch at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok (for more information see 
www.populationasia.org). A series of two workshops in 2001 and 2002 were dedicated to an 
exercise to identify the main drivers of demographic change in Asia and to translate these 
insights into probabilistic projections. This included the more traditional analysis of past time 
series, where available, the study of the errors of past projections and individual expert 
statements about the assumptions of the most likely trends in vital rates together with 
subjective quantitative assessments of the uncertainty ranges. This exercise also included new 
methods such as a rather large number of in-depth interviews of experts in which they were 
extensively asked about their reasons for making certain assumptions rather than others, and 
during which an attempt was made to assess about which assumptions the experts felt more 
confident or less confident. These interviews were conducted by an expert in cognitive 
science, who is an expert on experts, but not on population. Based on these findings the 
exercise then went one step further to try to explicitly model the one structural determinant 
that has been singled out as the single most important one, namely female education, and 
make the future fertility uncertainty dependent on future education in the context of 
probabilistic projections. To our knowledge such a structural approach to probabilistic 
projections has not been applied before. 
This paper has four main parts. First, we briefly describe the ex post error analysis that 
has been carried out with reference to the 1975 and 1980 UN projections, in order to set the 
stage with a view to uncertainty. Next, we will show what happens when the individual expert 
assessments about trends and uncertainty are merged with respect to individual countries and 
directly translated into probabilistic projections. We then proceed to the meta-analysis of 
individual expert views and arguments that also draws on the in-depth interviews; from there 
we move toward defining a structural model. In the final section, we proceed to a probabilistic 
projection based on the results of the structural modeling. 
The exercise was carried out in close collaboration with more than 50 Asian national 
population experts.1 Since in the context of this short paper it is impossible to present these 
steps for all of the Asian countries for which the exercise was carried out, we had to be 
extremely selective. Instead of the possibly more consistent way of presenting all the steps for 
just one country, we chose the alternative option of illustrating different aspects of the 
exercise with data from different countries to present a better view of the Asian panorama and 
to better acknowledge the participation of experts from many countries in this exercise. 
                                                 
1
 A list of participants is available from the Asian MetaCentre’s home page: www.populationasia.org 
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Analysis of Errors in Past Projections of Six Southeast Asian 
Countries 
When we think about the uncertainty of future demographic trends and by how much our 
forecasts today may turn out to be wrong, it is always a useful first exercise to look at 
projections produced in the past and see how well they did. Different ways for doing such ex 
post error analyses have been discussed by Keilmann (1999) and Alho (1997). A recent report 
by the US National Research Council (2000) also summarizes work in this field and 
recommends ex post error analysis as an important part of any effort of probabilistic 
population projections. It seems to us that such an exercise is particularly useful when it not 
only looks at the mean percentage error of total population size or other output variables, but 
also at the specific assumptions that lead to these errors and if possible, even tries to find out 
why and with what justification the forecasters in the past made the assumptions the way they 
did (Lutz et al. 2003). 
Since it was difficult to find a consistent set of nationally-produced population 
projections for a large number of Asian countries that were produced at least 20-30 years ago, 
it was decided to use the United Nations projections with base years in 1975 and 1980. These 
estimates and projections were then compared to the United Nations 1998 assessment (United 
Nations 1999). This analysis was carried out by the Asian MetaCentre and is fully 
documented in Khan (2003). Here we will only highlight selected findings with respect to the 
trends in the total fertility rate. 
The upper panel of Table 1 compares the 1975 projections to the 1998 estimates; the 
lower panel compares the 1980 projections to the same 1998 estimates. We present the 
comparisons of both projections because there are significant differences that are indicative 
for what can go wrong with projections. To the right of each panel we find a decomposition of 
the total error into the error that is due to wrong estimates of the baseline data and the error 
that is due to wrong assumptions about the change in fertility over time. 
For the 1975 projections it turns out that the baseline errors in four of the six countries 
were more significant than the errors due to wrong fertility change assumptions. For Thailand 
this error was particularly big; for the period 1975-80, the UN 1975 projections (which is 
actually the 1978 assessment published in 1980) give a TFR of 5.53 while now the 1975-80 
level is only estimated at 4.25. In the Philippines there have been compensating errors in 
different directions; the 1975-80 level was overestimated by 0.87 children, but the decline was 
assumed too rapid by 0.74 children, so that the total error turned out to be very small. In other 
cases, such as Vietnam, there were errors in the same direction. A great underestimation of 
the decline by 1.54 children adds to a minor baseline error of 0.25 children producing a very 
significant total error of 1.8 children: Instead of a projected TFR of 4.4 it turned out to be 2.6. 
Averaging over all six countries, both the baseline error and the change error were 0.6 
children. Because of partly compensating errors they do not add up to a total error of 1.2 but 
only 0.86. 
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Table 1.  Total fertility rate. Source: Khan (2003, p. 18). 
 
 1975 Projection        1998 Estimate (UN 1999) 
Country 1975-1980 1995-2000 Projected
decline
1975-1980 1995-2000 Estimated
decline
Total
error
Base
error
Change
error
Indonesia 5.13 3.38 1.75 4.68 2.58 2.1 0.8 0.45 0.35
Malaysia  4.26 2.7 1.56 4.16 3.18 0.98 -0.48 0.1 -0.58
Philippines  5.83 3.75 2.08 4.96 3.62 1.34 0.13 0.87 -0.74
Singapore  2.47 2.1 0.37 1.87 1.68 0.19 0.42 0.6 -0.18
Thailand  5.53 3.28 2.25 4.25 1.74 2.51 1.54 1.28 0.26
Vietnam  5.84 4.39 1.45 5.59 2.6 2.99 1.79 0.25 1.54
 Mean absolute error: 0.860 0.592 0.608
   
 1980 Projection        1998 Estimate (UN 1999) 
Country 1975-1980 1995-2000 Projected
decline
1975-1980 1995-2000 Estimated
decline
Total
error
Base
error
Change
error
Indonesia 4.81 2.46 2.35 4.68 2.58 2.1 -0.12 0.13 -0.25
Malaysia  5.03 2.46 2.57 4.16 3.18 0.98 -0.72 0.87 -1.59
Philippines  4.62 2.87 1.75 4.96 3.62 1.34 -0.75 -0.34 -0.41
Singapore  1.84 1.74 0.1 1.87 1.68 0.19 0.06 -0.03 0.09
Thailand  4.27 2.51 1.76 4.25 1.74 2.51 0.77 0.02 0.75
Vietnam  5.48 2.87 2.61 5.59 2.6 2.99 0.27 -0.11 0.38
Mean absolute error: 0.448 0.250 0.578
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For the 1980 projection (which is the 1982 assessment published in 1985) the baseline 
errors are significantly lower. Obviously, the demographic information systems in those 
countries have improved significantly over these five years. As a consequence the total error 
is only 0.45, almost half the level of the 1975 projections. The change error, on the other 
hand, is at almost the same level as above. In other words, while the quality of information 
about the baseline demographic data has greatly improved, the quality of the assumptions has 
not – despite the fact that the projection period was five years shorter. The errors again go in 
both directions. In Malaysia the fertility decline was greatly overestimated, while in 
neighboring Thailand, it was strongly underestimated. 
What did we learn from this ex post error analysis? The first thing we learned was the 
importance of the baseline error, which is often underestimated by forecasters. On the other 
hand, we see a clearly improving trend over time. Since by any standard demographic 
estimates through vital registration, surveys and censuses in these countries are significantly 
better today than in the early 1980s, it does not seem to be meaningful to expect similar 
baseline errors for today’s projections. As to the errors in the assumed fertility change the 
great difference even between neighboring countries shows that clearly more attention needs 
to be given to specific national social, cultural und economic features. The national experts 
from those countries participating in the exercise thought that part of the problem was that the 
projections were made in New York without such specific knowledge. This is, of course, easy 
to say in retrospect. The real challenge is how to include such in-depth knowledge about the 
specific national conditions in new projections. As we will see in the following, exclusively 
relying on national experts’ opinions may also not be the optimal solution. 
Directly Translating the Merged Expert Views into Probabilistic 
Projections for the Philippines 
As part of the written enquiry among population experts in Asia about future demographic 
trends and their uncertainty, seven experts from the Philippines filled out questionnaires 
specifying uncertainty ranges for fertility, mortality and migration in their country and 
specifying their reasons for making these assumptions. In addition to these questionnaires, the 
same group of experts engaged in a group discussion with the task to specify a joint 
distribution. 
Table 2 shows the ranges that the seven experts individually specified for the TFR in 
2015-2020 and 2045-2050. As is evident from the table, several experts did not define 
symmetric uncertainty distributions. This is perfectly consistent with the task given to them, 
namely, to allocate 100 percentage points over a given range of TFR categories for the 
specified years. The questionnaire gave them several different examples of how this could be 
done, but the examples had nothing to do with demography in order not to influence their 
statements; the sample distributions were both symmetric and asymmetric. 
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Table 2. Fertility levels and uncertainty ranges defined by individual experts from the 
Philippines. 
 
TFR in 
2015-2020 
 
Expert number  
Expert 
number
Range 1 2 3 4 5 6 Range 7
<1.33 10 10       
1.33-1.67 10 85  2 10  1.3-1.8 90
1.67-2 80 5 90 25 80 20 1.8-2.3 10
2-2.33   10 68 10 70   
2.33-2.67    5  10   
2.67-3         
 
TFR in 
2045-2050 
 
Expert number  
Expert 
number
Range 1 2 3 4 5 6 Range 7
<1.33 10 10     <1.3 20
1.33-1.67 10 75 90 4 10  1.3-1.8 60
1.67-2 80 15 10 65 90 40 1.8-2.3 20
2-2.33    30  50   
2.33-2.67    1  10   
2.67-3         
 
 
Figure 1 merges these seven independent distributions by giving equal weight to each 
expert. Since the six experts were of different academic standing and for some the substantive 
arguments listed for justifying their choice made more sense than for others (with this not 
being a direct function of academic seniority), one could have weighted the individual experts 
when producing the merged distribution. But since there are no easily accepted criteria for 
assigning different weights to individual experts, we leave this to future research and assume 
equal weights here. 
Although the merged distributions shown in Figure 1 are more symmetric than the 
individual distributions, they do not perfectly resemble normal distributions, which have been 
the basis for most expert-defined uncertainty distributions so far (Lutz et al. 1999). Since 
there is no reason why the simulations that produce the probability distributions of output 
parameters need to be based on symmetric assumptions, here we take the expert-defined 
assumptions at face value and directly translate them into independent cohort component 
projection simulations, which also consider the mortality assumptions that were specified by 
the experts in a similar manner as fertility (Scherbov 2002). The only thing that could not be 
done with these non-normal distributions was to assume correlations between the distributions 
as done in Lutz et al. (2001). But since we assume independent fertility, mortality and 
migration trends for the Philippines, and since inter-country correlations are not an issue 
because we produce independent projections for each country, this is not a limiting factor 
here. 
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Figure 1.  Merged distribution of the individual ranges given in Table 2 for fertility (above) 
and life expectancy (below). 
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The results of the group processes for defining uncertainty distributions are discussed 
in more detail in Scherbov (2002). The distributions agreed by the groups tend to be 
significantly different from the merged distribution of the individual experts. In the case of the 
Philippines the group consensus has a lower range of uncertainty. This is a process frequently 
described in the literature on group dynamics and attributable either to the dominance of one 
person or a group desire for uniformity with individuals uneasy to challenge the majority 
opinion. For this reason we took the merged distribution of individual statements as the basis 
for the projections presented below. 
Figure 2 and Table 3 give the results of 1,000 independent cohort component 
projection simulations based on the fertility distributions as shown in Table 2 and the 
corresponding individual mortality distributions. The stochastic process assumed includes 
annual fluctuations in fertility and mortality as described in Lutz et al. (2001). The results 
show that the total population of the Philippines is likely to increase significantly over the 
coming 20 years from around 77 million to well above 100 million. For 2050 the 80 percent 
uncertainty range is 109-145 million, the median 127 million. Table 3 also shows that 
simultaneous to this significant growth of approximately 65 percent, the population of the 
Philippines will rapidly age. The proportion aged 65+ will likely increase by a factor of four 
from currently 4 percent to 17 percent. The 80 percent uncertainty range in 2050 is 14-20 
percent, which means that an increase by at least a factor of three is almost certain. 
 
Figure 2.  Probabilistic projection of total population size in the Philippines. 
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Table 3.  Results of probabilistic projections for the Philippines for selected demographic variables. 
 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Total population 
(in millions) 
76.618 
 (76.612-76.625)
92.521 
 (91.649-93.410)
104.586 
 (100.580-108.451)
114.460 
 (106.346-122.495)
122.416 
 (110.021-135.151)
126.587 
 (109.488-145.146) 
Proportion below age 15 
 
0.363 
 (0.363-0.363) 
0.318 
 (0.313-0.323) 
0.252 
 (0.230-0.272) 
0.205 
 (0.172-0.235) 
0.192 
 (0.160-0.223) 
0.170 
 (0.136-0.205) 
Proportion 15-65 
 
0.599 
 (0.599-0.599) 
0.636 
 (0.631-0.641) 
0.683 
 (0.663-0.703) 
0.699 
 (0.673-0.730) 
0.680 
 (0.656-0.708) 
0.662 
 (0.637-0.688) 
Proportion above age 65 
 
0.038 
 (0.038-0.038) 
0.046 
 (0.045-0.048) 
0.065 
 (0.060-0.073) 
0.093 
 (0.082-0.110) 
0.125 
 (0.106-0.151) 
0.166 
 (0.138-0.200) 
Old age dependency ratio 
(65+ / 15-65) 
0.064 
 (0.064-0.064) 
0.073 
 (0.071-0.075) 
0.095 
 (0.087-0.107) 
0.132 
 (0.116-0.158) 
0.182 
 (0.155-0.224) 
0.250 
 (0.206-0.310) 
Support ratio 
 
15.656 
 (15.652-15.660)
13.732 
 (13.271-14.065)
10.560 
 (9.322-11.516) 
7.568 
 (6.317-8.652) 
5.487 
 (4.468-6.440) 
4.004 
 (3.230-4.863) 
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Meta-Analysis of Expert Views and the Transition to a 
Structural Model Considering Education 
The above-described projections directly translate what a group of national experts said 
were their best knowledge-based assumptions for the future demographic trends in the 
Philippines. As international experts designing and analyzing this exercise in defining 
uncertainty ranges of future fertility and mortality, we are certainly less knowledgeable 
than the national experts about the specific conditions and trends in the countries 
concerned. But we also see some problems that tell us that to simply take the 
distributions defined by the group of national experts and directly translate them into 
projections, should not be the end of the story. More can and should be done. 
Taking a bird’s eye view as meta-experts, there are two apparent concerns with 
simply taking the numerical assumptions as given by the national experts. First, the 
merging of the individual distributions turned out to be quite different from the 
uncertainty distribution subsequently defined through a group process. Second, these 
numerical assumptions neither reflect the value of the arguments provided by the 
individual experts nor the analysis of the large array of issues raised in the in-depth 
interviews with the experts. After reading through the transcribed interviews (which do 
not disclose the person’s identity) and looking at their analysis by an experimental 
psychologist (the analysis of these interviews will be described elsewhere) the specific 
quantitative statements made by the experts certainly look less stable and reliable. It 
also showed that some national experts were very hesitant to make such statements, 
while others were extremely confident in what they specified. But this could be more a 
feature of the personality and his/her character than a reflection of the solidity of the 
knowledge base. 
How can one further proceed from this sobering assessment of the cognitive 
base on which individual experts based their statements about future trends and their 
uncertainty ranges? In the context of scientific work, the only way out of this is to take 
the usual scientific approach to try to distinguish between the message and the 
substantive arguments on the one hand, and the person who makes these points on the 
other. Although in practice these two things can never fully be separated, there are 
methods of scientific discourse and peer review that can evaluate arguments 
independently of the person bringing them up. This issue is extensively discussed in 
another paper (Saariluoma 2002). Since the substantive arguments brought up by the 
experts in explaining and projecting demographic trends covered a very wide spectrum 
(ranging from the impact of electrification in rural villages on fertility to specific 
government heath policies) it turned out to be impossible to carry out the broad meta-
level evaluation of specific arguments in the context of the international literature on 
these topics, as had originally been planned. Instead we chose to single out the one 
argument that would feature most prominently in most of the expert interviews. The 
choice was not difficult because in addition to the rather diffuse reference to all kinds of 
government policies, female education clearly stood out as the single most important 
factor mentioned. All of the national experts from the different countries in Asia 
involved in the exercise almost consistently mentioned that they thought that the 
improving level of female education has been and will be the main driver of fertility 
decline. 
 11
The line of argumentation in these interviews seems clear: The combination of 
great educational fertility differentials in Asia (more highly educated women have 
significantly lower fertility) with the fact that younger women are and will be more 
educated than the older women, greatly contributes to fertility decline. However, as 
clear and convincing as the argument seems at first, it becomes a bit more complex 
when thought through in specific quantitative terms. 
As an example of this exercise of trying to operationalize the more qualitative 
expert view that the education of women greatly matters for fertility, we chose the 
world’s two most populous countries: India and China. Table 4 gives the most recently 
available educational fertility differentials for women in the two countries. The table 
gives the TFR for four categories of women: those without any formal education and 
those with some primary, secondary and tertiary education. The precise definition and 
discussion of these categories and educational fertility differentials in general are given 
in Lutz and Goujon (2001). The table clearly and impressively shows how in these two 
major countries, higher education is associated with lower fertility. The total TFR gives 
the fertility of the total population with weights of the different educational groups 
corresponding to the current educational composition in India and China. 
 
Table 4.  Education-specific and total TFR India and China. 
 India 2000 China 2000 
No education 3.78 2.43 
Some primary education 2.89 2.14 
Some secondary education 2.36 1.63 
Some tertiary education 1.96 1.08 
 
 
Figure 3 gives the age-, sex- and education-specific population pyramids for 
India as projected for 2030 under constant enrolment rates (Scenario 2) and ICPD goals 
(Scenario 1 – see definition below). The pyramids clearly show that the younger cohorts 
of women in India are better educated than the older ones, although the gender gap is 
still significant. Under the ICPD scenario the gender gap disappears for the younger 
segment of the population. 
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Figure 3.  Education-specific age pyramids for India under the two alternative education 
scenarios in 2003. 
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When we think about the future of fertility in India, we must differentiate 
between two different effects: (a) the change in the educational composition of the 
population, and (b) the fertility trends within each educational group. Empirical analysis 
shows that both have been changing in the past in most countries and there is reason to 
assume that they will continue to change in India, which is still in the midst of the 
process of demographic transition. For the educational composition, further 
improvement is a near certainty because it is already pre-programmed into the age 
structure: The younger, better-educated cohorts will inevitably become older and 
replace the older, less-educated cohorts. Only the future education of the young cohorts 
is uncertain at this point, depending on future school enrolment rates at different levels. 
Policies can make a difference here. We capture this difference through two extreme 
scenarios on girls’ education in India, one scenario in which all enrolment rates stay 
constant in the future (in a way the most pessimistic one) and another in which India 
manages to implement the ambitious education goals as defined in the 1994 Cairo 
World Population Conference (ICPD). This highly optimistic scenario assumes the 
elimination of the gender gap in primary and secondary education by 2005-10, 90 
percent net primary enrolment by 2010-15 and secondary enrolment of 75 percent by 
2025-30, as well as an increase in transition to tertiary education by 5 percentage points 
until 2025-30. Trends between 2000 and the target year are based on linear 
interpolation. 
Table 5 defines 12 scenarios that result from the cross-classification of different 
future trends in the educational structure of the population and different trends in 
education-specific fertility rates. The first four scenarios that keep the educational 
structure of the population frozen are of a purely hypothetical nature because, as has 
been mentioned above, it is already embedded in the age structure that over time the 
younger, more educated age groups will move the age scale and improve the average 
education of the female population of reproductive age. But it is still important to talk 
about this hypothetical case of the educational composition by age remaining constant 
in its current form because it serves as a point of reference in the minds of experts 
thinking about this issue. For this reason Figure 4 shows the aggregate level TFRs 
resulting from Scenarios 1 and 2 in 2050 as black dots to the right of the figure. If the 
educational composition remains frozen and the education-specific fertility remains 
constant (Scenario 1), then clearly the aggregate TFR remains constant over time. 
Scenario 2 gives the case in which the educational composition remains frozen, but 
education-specific fertility rates decline as discussed below. In this case the aggregate 
TFR declines by about one child, which is the fertility trend effect that is completely 
free of the effect of the changing educational structure. 
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Table 5. Definition of 12 scenarios combining different possible trends in the 
educational structure with different assumptions about education-specific fertility 
trends. 
 
 Educational Structure of the Population 
Fertility trends for 
educational 
categories 
Structure constant 
(purely 
hypothetical) 
Enrolment rates 
constant 
ICPD goals for 
enrolment 
All fertility rates 
constant 
1 5 9 
Rates reach Chinese 
level by 2030 
2 6 10 
China +0.5 by 2030 3 7 11 
China –0.5 by 2030 4 8 12 
 
 
Figure 4.  Selected scenarios for combining education assumptions with education-
specific fertility trends. 
 
 
 
 
Country:IND, Indicator: tfr, State:   stT
(10)
(6)
(9)
(5)
(2)
(1)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
Time
tfr
 15
During the course of the Asian MetaCentre exercise, we had quite some 
discussions about what should be assumed in terms of education-specific fertility trends. 
Experts did not provide us with their views on this because their assumptions always 
included the compositional changes. We considered three different options for dealing 
with these issues: (1) assuming proportional fertility changes in all educational 
categories, (2) assuming convergence of all educational fertility trends to one target 
level or (3) assuming that education-specific fertilities will move to the observed levels 
of another country that is already further advanced in the process of fertility decline. 
Option (1) is not meaningful as a general rule because in some countries the fertility of 
university graduates is already so low that no further declines will be expected, although 
the fertility of less-educated women is expected to decline. In a country like Singapore, 
where the aggregate TFR is expected to increase, the fertility of the lowest educational 
group is still above 4.0 und certainly not expected to increase. Option (2) is also not 
meaningful in this context, because if we have complete convergence, by definition the 
changes in the educational composition do not affect aggregate fertility. For this reason 
we chose Option (3), which is consistent with the frequent demographic practice to 
think in terms of analogies, as is more generally done in the context of the demographic 
transition. Specifically, for the case of India presented here, we assumed that in 2030, 
India will have education-specific fertility rates comparable to those of China today. A 
qualitative discussion of this assumption concluded that this is a meaningful way of 
handling the issue. 
Figure 4 also gives four lines for the cross-classification of the two assumptions 
for education-specific fertility (constant versus linear change to the Chinese pattern) 
with the two education assumptions (constant enrolment versus the ICPD Scenario). 
When comparing Scenarios 5 and 9 and 6 and 10, respectively, we see that the changing 
educational structure makes a significant difference even with identical education-
specific fertility trends. By 2050 this difference accounts for more than half a child, i.e., 
more than one-third of the level of fertility as given by Scenario 10. If we also consider 
the hypothetical case of a frozen education structure (Scenario 2) the difference due to 
differential educational structures becomes almost one child. This clearly illustrates that 
the experts have made a valid and quantitatively important point when they suggested 
that the changing educational structure would be a major force towards lower fertility. 
How should these insights be translated into probabilistic fertility assumptions? 
The first thing that is unclear in this context is whether experts, when they stressed the 
effect of the changing educational composition, had one of the two extremes – the 
constant enrolment scenario or the ICPD scenario – or something in between in mind. A 
qualitative discussion with some of the experts at the second seminar indicated that this 
uncertainty about future school enrolment should be assumed to be part of the total 
fertility uncertainty. As to the uncertainty of education-specific fertility trends, it was 
assumed that the uncertainty range considered here would be half a child up and down, 
as compared to the mean trend (Scenarios 6 and 10), which is the linear move from the 
Indian 2000 rates to the Chinese 2000 rates by 2030. This is consistent with what was 
assumed in Lutz et al. (2001). There the 80 percent range was assumed to be plus/minus 
one child if the TFR was above 3.0, and plus/minus 0.5 if it was below 2.0, with linear 
interpolation in between. Since this was also supposed to include the education 
uncertainty in addition to the education-specific fertility uncertainty, these assumptions 
are roughly consistent. 
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Figure 5 gives the four scenarios that combine the plus/minus 0.5 children in 
education-specific fertility assumptions with the two extreme education scenarios. 
Following the logic outlined above the appearing range between Scenarios 7 and 12 is 
then taken to represent the 90 percent uncertainty interval of a normal distribution 
representing India’s fertility uncertainty in any given year between 2000 and 2050. 
 
Figure 5.  Selected scenarios combining education-specific fertility trends, which are 0.5 
children higher and lower than the mean with different future education trends. 
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opens up over time. But the graph also shows that with very high probability, India’s 
population will increase from presently 1 billion to more than 1.2 billion by 2020. The 
median shows a stabilization of India’s population size after 2035 at a level of roughly 
1.4 billion. But the uncertainty range becomes very broad beyond 2030. While in more 
than 20 percent of the simulations, India’s population starts to decline after 2030, in 
another 20 percent of the cases, it shows very significant further growth, with the upper 
end of the 95 percent interval reaching 1.7 billion by 2050. In the black bracket in 
Figure 6, one sees the total population numbers that result from Scenarios 6 and 10 as 
discussed above, i.e., the central fertility decline assumption combined with the two 
different educational scenarios. The difference is very significant and in the order of 0.2 
billion. In other words, these calculations imply that with otherwise identical 
assumptions, an India that will follow the ICPD education goals will have 200 million 
people less than an India with constant school enrolment ratios. 
 
Figure 6.  Resulting distribution of total population size in India. 
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Table 6 gives the numerical results of these new probabilistic population 
projections for India. The values given refer to the median, with the 80 percent intervals 
given in parentheses. This shows that despite an expected further population growth of 
around 40 percent over the coming five decades, India’s population will also get 
significantly older. The proportion above age 65 will increase from currently only 5 
percent to around 14 percent with the 80 percent uncertainty range going from 0.12 to 
0.16. The proportion of children below age 15 will likely decrease to about half its level, 
from currently 0.35 to only 0.17. For the children, the 80 percent uncertainty interval is 
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much larger, ranging from 0.11 to 0.21. The fact that the uncertainty ranges differ 
greatly by age is most clearly shown by the probabilistic age pyramid in Figure 7. 
Unlike such pyramids for industrialized countries, where there is also visible uncertainty 
at a very old age due to the uncertainty about the path of future old age mortality, this is 
not yet visible in India because the population is still much younger and life expectancy 
is still much lower. Hence the giant share of the uncertainty of India’s future population 
is due to fertility uncertainty. 
 
Table 6.  Medians and 80 percent ranges (in parentheses) for selected projection output 
parameters in India. 
 
 2000 2025 2050 
Total population 
 
1.009 
 (1.009-1.009) 
1.321 
 (1.268-1.374) 
1.403 
 (1.208-1.603) 
Proportion below age 15 
 
0.335 
 (0.335-0.335) 
0.238 
 (0.212-0.260) 
0.167 
 (0.113-0.213) 
Proportion 15-65 
 
0.615 
 (0.615-0.615) 
0.691 
 (0.671-0.714) 
0.697 
 (0.660-0.733) 
Proportion above age 65 
 
0.050 
 (0.050-0.050) 
0.071 
 (0.068-0.075) 
0.138 
 (0.117-0.161) 
Old age dependency ratio 
(65+ / 15-65) 
0.081 
 (0.081-0.081) 
0.103 
 (0.099-0.107) 
0.198 
 (0.172-0.228) 
Support ratio 
 
12.395 
 (12.395-12.395) 
9.690 
 (9.332-10.053) 
5.060 
 (4.388-5.811) 
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Figure 7.  Probabilistic population pyramid for India in 2030. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The paramount importance of the specific path of the future fertility trend in India on 
the total population size is an ex post justification for spending a considerable amount of 
time and effort to capture some of the structural determinants of future fertility trends in 
India. Whether or not there will be 200 million more Indians in 2050 is not a trivial 
issue. As we have shown, this will depend significantly on the future educational efforts 
in India. 
The analysis presented here has only been a first step in the direction of trying to 
incorporate this very important structural dimension of population uncertainty into 
population projections. Much more attention should be given to this and other important 
structural drivers of fertility decline in developing countries in the future. Here we 
focused on female education as probably the most important observable source of 
fertility heterogeneity. Urbanization would be the next logical candidate for such 
analysis. But it should probably be cross-classified with education (Cao and Lutz 
forthcoming). 
In conclusion we can say that the explicit consideration of some of the most 
important drivers of changes in demographic rates can make a major difference in the 
way we see the population evolve in the future. This is particularly true in the context of 
probabilistic population projections, where the uncertainty about the evolution of the 
structure of heterogeneous populations is added to the uncertainty about demographic 
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trends within each sub-population. This aspect is quantitatively more important in 
heterogeneous populations, such as India, than in the more homogeneous ones. 
How to deal with this issue in the context of specific populations to be 
forecasted, cannot be determined purely by statistical models. It requires deep 
substantive analysis and inevitably a degree of expert judgment. But we should be 
careful to base our assumptions on explicit arguments that are open to the usual 
instruments of scientific review and evaluation. 
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